Severe personality disorder, treatment engagement and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: what you need to know by Mcrae, LM
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjfp20
The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology
ISSN: 1478-9949 (Print) 1478-9957 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjfp20
Severe personality disorder, treatment
engagement and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: what you need
to know
Leon McRae
To cite this article: Leon McRae (2016) Severe personality disorder, treatment engagement
and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: what you
need to know, The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 27:4, 476-488, DOI:
10.1080/14789949.2016.1155227
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2016.1155227
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 31 Mar 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 1031
View Crossmark data
The Journal of forensic PsychiaTry & Psychology, 2016
Vol. 27, no. 4, 476–488
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2016.1155227
Severe personality disorder, treatment engagement 
and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012: what you need to know
Leon McRae
Dickson Poon school of law, King’s college london, uK
ARTICLE HISTORY received 25 september 2015; accepted 12 february 2016
KEYWORDS severe personality disorder; Treatment engagement; indeterminate sentence for Public 
Protection (iPP); extended Determinate sentence (eDs); legal aid, sentencing and Punishment of 
offenders (lasPo 2012); offender Personality Disorder Pathway implementation Plan
Introduction
In 2013, I reported on the findings of an Economic and Research Council (ESRC)-
funded grant looking at the legal, therapeutic and interrelational implications of 
transferring those with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) from prisons to an 
experienced secure personality disorder ward within the medium secure estate 
(McRae, 2013). The data were collected during the IPP-era, and shed light on the 
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under-researched impact of indeterminate sentences on treatment engagement 
among offenders with ASPD. It was overwhelmingly found that offenders were 
engaging with treatment as part of an overarching strategy aimed at expe-
diting parole (either during or following the expiry of their tariff period). for 
some, that strategy extended to seeking, and gaining entry, to medium secure 
units in order to overcome the problem of scarce prison resources connected 
to the Indeterminate Sentence for Public Protection (IPP). The long-term desire 
of this group was to convince the Parole Board that they had mitigated their risk 
through specialised treatment. Consider, for example, the following accounts:
[In hospital], you get on courses, boom, straight away. But in prison, there’s 
a big waiting list, you can wait years and years to get on courses … To be 
honest, I thought I’ll just give it a shot, and see what’s what. (Mr B) (ibid., p. 56)
I was kind of excited [by my pre-admission assessment], but I weren’t [sic] really 
as honest, well, I think I was perhaps too honest in the assessment … I probably 
exaggerated some of my answers … I knew what kind of stuff [the practitioners] 
were looking for. (Mr D) (McRae, 2015, p. 331)
My recommendation for sentencing was DSPD … I was waiting for a referral from 
[a DSPD prison unit] … They told me to expect to do 13 years, 13, 14 years. My 
tariff’s 3 years … I was told if I don’t do a DSPD, it’s highly unlikely I’m being paroled. 
So, that’s why I’ve come to this [hospital]. Hopefully, I can do enough [treatment] 
here to cancel out the DSPD. And I think I have. (Mr C) (ibid.)
While around 3633 offenders continue to be incapacitated in prisons by the 
IPP (as of 30 October 2014: Ministry of Justice [MJ], 2015), the sentence has not 
been passed for over three years. In its place, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) introduced a new Extended 
Determinate Sentence (EDS) for those ‘who would have previously been eligible 
for either an IPP or an Extended sentence for Public Protection (EPP) [for under 
21s]’ (MJ, 2011a, para 25). The most important change introduced by the EDS is 
that offenders receive a prison release date. I argue in this paper that one unan-
ticipated, and undiscussed, side effect of this change will be that it demotivates 
offenders from seeking out, or tolerating, treatment.
In making this argument, I do not assert that the IPP was reserved for those 
most in need of treatment, or that those with ASPD were the intended benefi-
ciaries of the sentence; rather, I recapitulate empirical evidence demonstrating 
that the threat of coercion faced by those under the IPP – many of whom will 
meet a diagnosis for ASPD (Department of Health and Ministry of Justice [DH 
and MJ], 2011, p. 9) – appears to have encouraged them to seek out and tolerate 
treatment. Nevertheless, I intend no bold claims either about the suitability of 
sentencing law to induce treatment engagement among offenders or that its 
primary purpose is to affect it. As Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ once put 
it: ‘The primary object of the IPP sentence [was] to protect the public, not to 
rehabilitate the offender’ (Walker and James v Secretary of State [2008] EWCA Civ 
30, para 69). However, in this judgment, he was bound to concede: ‘The evidence 
478  L. MCRAE
is that prisoners serving [the] IPP have no realistic prospect of being released at 
the direction of the Parole Board unless they have attended relevant offending 
behaviour programmes …’ (ibid., para 15). My position is therefore, necessarily, 
pragmatic: an inherent benefit of the coercively framed IPP was that it could 
encourage treatment engagement.
Outside the sentencing context, concern about poor treatment motiva-
tion and offender apathy towards treatment has recently been expressed in 
the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway Implementation Plan (OPDPP: DH 
and MJ, 2011). In brief, the OPDPP outlines plans to reinvest funds previously 
pumped into the dangerous and severe personality disorder (DSPD) pilot into 
the high-secure prison estate for those with severe personality disorder (SPD). 
The aim of the OPDPP is ostensibly simple: to provide offenders with specialist 
treatment ‘to help them lead less destructive lives’ (ibid., p. 6). With this goal in 
mind, interested medical have taken up the challenge of working with this group 
by enrolling on various educational programmes, from diploma to PhD level, as 
part of the Knowledge and understanding framework (Kuf: http://www.per-
sonalitydisorderkuf.org.uk/index.html) run in conjunction with the Personality 
Disorder Institute in Nottingham. This coalescing of talented and dedicated 
medical practitioners for a population once recognised as neglected (National 
Institute of Mental Health in England [NIMH(E)], 2003) is a notable success of 
the initiative. A possible benefit of knowledge exchange is that issues of staff 
burnout, low morale, stress and managerialism may be better managed than 
hitherto:
Someone was brought crying their eyes out because they were being moved to 
[the personality disorder ward for patients from Rampton]. Their interest is mental 
health … and they’ve made people aware, rather than personality disorder. (Nurse)
In this paper, however, I argue that the laudable aim of improving treatment 
engagement among SPD-offenders and improving workforce capacities will 
be undermined by the introduction of the EDS. An important, and potentially 
disastrous, consequence of poor treatment engagement caused by the EDS may 
be increased reliance by the Secretary of State for Justice on his jurisdiction to 
transfer sentenced prisoners who have reached their earliest release date to 
hospital for ‘treatment’ under section 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Elsewhere, I have attempted to answer this possible side effect by propos-
ing further sentencing reform and enthusing medical professionals to inveigh 
against late transfers (McRae, 2015). Here, my aim is to elucidate those aspects 
of the EDS and OPDPP that indicate the need for these implicit, co-optive 
responses. The problem, I argue, is that, unlike the former Labour government 
who considered, if in brief, the potential impact of the IPP on treatment take-up 
in DSPD units (Ministry of Justice, 2005), the coalition government failed to 
acknowledge the empirically proven link between legal coercion (through inde-
terminate sentencing) and treatment motivation among SPD-offenders (ibid.).
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LASPO 2012: Disjuncture between the EDS and offender 
responsibilisation
In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights heard the case of James, Wells & 
Lee v The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 25119/09, 57715/09, and 57877/09 [2012] 
ECHR 1706. The applicants alleged, inter alia, that the failure to provide treat-
ment courses required by their IPP sentence plan was unlawful under Article 5(1)
(a) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR concurred, ruling 
that, while the fact that rehabilitation was not ‘an express [statutory] objective’ 
of the IPP, the sentence had to provide ‘a real opportunity for rehabilitation is 
a necessary element of any part of the detention which is to be justified solely 
by reference to public protection’ (para 209). In the aftermath of the judgment 
(though not explicitly acknowledged as a catalyst by government), the LASPO 
2012 was enacted to amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003. One effect was the 
abolition of the IPP on 3 December 2012 (section 123 of the LASPO 2012), which 
was replaced by the EDS.
In contrast to indeterminate sentences, offenders receiving the EDS are 
released from custody at the two-thirds point in their sentence. The one caveat 
is that offenders serving a custodial term of 10 years of more – or those who 
have not previously been sentenced to a term of 10 years or more, in which 
case a discretionary life sentence can be passed – will be released on reaching 
their full term, unless the Parole Board authorises release at the two-thirds point. 
This means that, although the sentences under the amended Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 are generally longer compared to determinate sentences passed dur-
ing the IPP-era (MJ, 2014b, p. 23), EDS-offenders are guaranteed a release date. 
If released prior to the completion of the sentence, EDS-offenders placed on 
licence: a maximum of 5 years for a violent offence and 8 years for a sexual 
offence (section 226A (8)).
using prison population data as a best estimate, the number of offenders 
receiving the EDS stands at 1,359 offenders between 3 December 2012 and 31 
December 2014 (MJ, 2014a, p. 23), with a disproportionate increase of around 
460 since March 2014 (MJ, 2014b, p. 15). The average custodial sentence length is 
of 8.1 years (MJ, 2014a, p. 23). So, what does this mean for the ASPD population?
During the IPP-era, the Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health (SCMH) (2008) 
found that 66% of offenders serving the sentence required clinical assessment 
for personality disorder. This indicates that a similarly high proportion of EDS-
offenders meet diagnostic criteria for (anti-) social personality disorder, with all 
the therapeutic uncertainties and interrelational tensions that attend. The coa-
lition government was, nevertheless, silent on the relationship between ASPD 
and the EDS. As part of the bland strategy aimed at ‘ensuring that justice is clearly 
seen to be done’ (MJ, 2011a, para 33), it was asserted that ‘All offenders under 
[this] sentence will be required to follow a sentence plan including undertaking 
a range of targeted rehabilitative interventions, aimed at reducing their risk’ 
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(ibid., para 27). The closest we come to an appreciation of the complexities 
involved in rehabilitating this group is their observation that the success of 
‘rehabilitative interventions’ is predicated on ‘offenders taking responsibility and 
action to reform’ (ibid., para 35).
Despite the absence of careful consideration of the implications of having 
ASPD in this new sentencing context, we have been given assurances by the 
coalition government that ‘all methods of effective rehabilitation [will be] con-
sidered and used …’ (ibid., para 35). But nowhere in their account of offender 
responsibilisation and rehabilitation is a frank discussion of the relationship 
between treatment take-up and sentencing context. Below, I argue that two 
linked ill-effects may result from the government’s deprivileging of sentencing 
context from treatment provision and engagement. first, plans contained in the 
OPDPP to improve treatment engagement among offenders in the high-secure 
prison estate will be undermined. Second, the public protection response may to 
increase late hospital transfers of determinate sentence offenders under section 
47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Rereading the OPPDP through the lens of the EDS
The OPPDP justifies plans to reinvest funding from DSPD units to the high-se-
cure prison estate on the basis that more treatment places will be available for 
SPD-offenders: up from around 350 under DSPD hospitals and prisons to 570 
in Category A prisons. further, 820 aftercare places in Psychologically Informed 
Planned Environments (PIPES) will be available for those who have completed 
a period of treatment (including those within the ‘pathway’), so that changes 
in behaviour can be overseen in the community.
The underlying policy ambition is to improve self-responsibility among 
offenders with SPD and, ultimately, public protection by identifying those with 
‘a minimum of three years still to serve’ (ibid., p. 18). Long term, provided spend-
ing plans remained unchanged under the conservative government, ‘pre-path-
way’ facilities will eventually be implemented to improve treatment motivation 
among newly sentenced offenders through collaboration between professionals 
on matters of ‘case formulation and sentence planning’ (ibid., p. 9).
While continued efforts to invest in a marginalised population will be wel-
comed by those working in the field, the details of how existing SPD-offenders 
will be identified are extremely sketchy. Both close supervision centres and those 
with many prison adjudications are identified as sources of complex cases need-
ing treatment. However, the OPDPP is clear that ‘where prisoners meet the crite-
ria of the Mental Health Act they will be detained in hospital’ (DH and MJ, 2011, 
p. 9). Therefore, if close supervision centres are, even in part, relied upon, the 
‘high levels of self-harming behaviours due to [the population’s] clinical needs’ 
presented there (Hodson, quoted in Allison, 2011) would presumably preclude 
admission to ‘the pathway’. By comparison, how do you discriminate between 
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large numbers of prisoners with numerous adjudications? Are there sufficient 
resources to screen all those causing interrelational problems in prison? Surely 
not. If, instead, resources are poured into screening at the sentencing stage, 
there is the unreliability of pre-sentence reports to contend with:
There are many [cases] where those [psychiatric] recommendations are not made 
[at sentencing] and you could easily say could be. (Psychologist) (McRae, 2015, 
p. 333).
At the outset, then, it is clear that many will not be identified for ‘the pathway’ 
who might most need treatment. Between those who are identified and those 
who are not, emphasis must be placed on offenders seeking treatment. In the 
context of hospital admissions during the IPP-era, this was accepted practice 
(at least outside the high-secure estate). Mr C, for example, states:
[The prison psychiatrist] was telling me I wasn’t suitable for [this hospital] … Then, 
one day, I thought fuck it … I got in touch with my solicitor and they commissioned 
for reports to be done, and he put the reports forward [to this hospital], and that 
was good enough. [The staff] came to see me, assess me … My behaviour controls 
my release date (ibid., p. 322)
unfortunately, the OPDPP has unwittingly delinked the importance of sentenc-
ing context from the achievement of motivating offenders. Early parole is clearly 
an important goal of anyone detained; legal coercion, whether via the IPP or 
otherwise, acts as a potent source of external motivation for SPD-offenders. 
Even now, personal correspondence with forensic psychiatrists working in the 
field indicates that personality disorder wards (at least of medium security) 
are accommodating indeterminate sentence prisoners. It seems optimistic to 
assume that these wards will come to be filled by determinate sentence pris-
oners equally eager to engage in a potentially therapeutic process.
This limitation of the EDS is most acute for those whose sentence is less 
than 10  years: unless the offender is genuinely motivated to change his or 
her self-understanding (and there is, as yet, little reason to assume this is the 
majority), the expectation of prison release at the two-thirds point of his or her 
sentence will weaken desire for treatment. By comparison, if the offender has 
received a sentence of over 10 years, he may decide to seek treatment when the 
completion of a few years of specialist treatment coincides with the two-thirds 
point of his sentence. Expecting him to self-identify early in his sentence for 
high-secure prison services is unrealistic. We would have to assume that SPD-
offenders understand the extent of the current risk of incapacitation, absent 
statistical or anecdotal evidence in research. An appreciation of the risk may only 
arise once the possibility of increased hospital transfers presented in this paper 
has been realised. Their engagement will be reactive rather than pre-emptive. 
furthermore, submission to treatment would also assume the offender per-
ceives a clear link between receiving treatment and expedited parole. Some 
may, indeed, have experience of being released post-treatment following the 
expiration of their tariff period under the IPP; others in this group will have 
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suffered incapacitation, perhaps in hospital, and perceive a fictive relationship 
between treatment and release. for instance, Mr E reflects:
I still have me [sic] ups and downs, we all have our ups and downs. It’s difficult 
anyway being an IPP prisoner or a lifer, because all of us here are lifers or IPPs. When 
you’re on that type of prisoner, it’s a killer because alls you’ve got is your hope and 
motivation, you’ve got no date to look forward to, nothing.
under the EDS, if offenders continued to be enticed by medium secure hospitals, 
it is likely to be for reasons unrelated to a true desire to change criminogenic 
outlook. Consider, for instance:
(1)  The interrelational tensions in prison, particular with staff, may encour-
age the belief that the hospital will be a more humane than prison:
Mr M states:  I couldn’t ask the prison officer for help. you couldn’t be seen as 
weak. In that environment, it’s them and us. you don’t play chess, 
you don’t play pool, you don’t play fucking scrabble with the prison 
officers. The moment you do, you’re labelled a wrong’un, a grass, 
and then you’re open to target, everyone wants ya. (McRae, 2013, 
p. 57.)
(2)  They may wish to achieve (escorted or unescorted) leave under the 
MHA (section 17 of the MHA);
(3)  They may (arguably, falsely) assume that release from hospital offers a 
better opportunity for aftercare:
Mr L states:  If you get released from [hospital], you get a massive release 
package. you go into residential care, where there is someone at 
hand if you’re having problems all the time. you get a [Community 
Psychiatric Nurse]. you’re known to social services. you get put 
on invalidity care benefits. you get given so much. you get more 
chance of being given a house, accommodation. (ibid., p. 334)
In view of the ostensible aim of the OPDPP of encouraging changes in self-un-
derstanding in SPD-offenders, it remains an important task of empirical and 
clinical investigation to uncover the extent to which, if any, motivation to enter 
treatment due to sentencing context might transmute into a true desire to 
change once the offender is exposed to psychiatric norms through treatment. 
A key challenge for treatment providers continues to be identifying whether 
treatment has actually been successful in reducing criminogenic risk. With the 
potential for offenders to enter and engage with treatment strategically (for 
discussion, see McRae, 2013, 2015), this is no easy task. Particularly, at the early 
stages of admission, an offender who presents as motivated by the process 
of change during pre-admission assessment may subsequently experience 
difficulty acculturating to the hospital environment. for example, one nurse 
comments:
[They’ll] present as very motivated in the [pre-admission assessment], and you’ll 
feel quite positive about them. But when they get here, they just can’t handle 
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it. They’ll fail in different ways. Some will decide they want to go back to prison 
themselves, because it’s not for them at that time, or they’ll go down the route of 
being violent to get back to prison. (McRae, 2015, p. 334)
In the past, (remorseful) offenders may have returned to hospital after a ‘period 
of reflection’ for further treatment (ibid., p. 55). Readmission in these circum-
stances inevitably encouraged belief that changes in self-understanding were 
possible, or indeed manifest. A psychiatrist posits: ‘[P]eople who aren’t particu-
larly motivated at the beginning have a sense, you know, I get what this is about 
and I want to do it properly’ (ibid., p. 58). While I believe an effective treatment 
dose may be achieved over time, even in the continued presence of ulterior 
motives for engagement (McRae, 2013, pp. 60–62), this possibility relies on SPD-
offenders identifying treatment engagement with their own best interests. Or, 
as has elsewhere been suggested, choice (whether or not false consciousness 
induced by psychiatric norms) rather than coercion – which has the potential to 
'mobilize his or her energies and resources in order to accomplish the treatment 
goal' (Winick, 1994, p. 105). In addition to perceiving a clear pathway into the 
community, the offender’s preference of treatment location clearly prefigures 
the choice to engage, and therefore the potential for changes in self-under-
standing that might result from treatment.
While a thorough exposition of the ability of treatment norms to effect behav-
iour change would clearly take us too far afield from the issue of sentencing, it is 
noteworthy that the OPDPP appears to be cynical of second attempts at treat-
ment outside the high-secure prison estate. Offenders who return to prison in 
the manner described above will unwittingly fall within the category of offender 
identified by the OPDPP as ‘unlikely to make progress in other interventions’ 
(DH and MJ, 2011, p. 18). If this becomes the route through which some, if not 
many, offenders are identified for ‘the pathway’, those serving a sentence of 
10 years who are nearing the two-thirds point in their sentence may equate 
engagement with an opportunity for parole before completion of the full term. 
In sharp contrast, those serving sentences less than 10 years who are close to 
their date of release will eschew treatment.
Based on past experiences, I argue that this scenario may encourage increased 
use of section 47 of the MHA by the Secretary of State for Justice, who will 
be concerned about public protection issues if treatment naïve offenders are 
released from custody. I expand on this hypothesis below.
Late hospital transfers: an unfortunate remedy for treatment 
naivety
The practice of transferring determinate sentence offenders to hospital at 
their release date is well documented. As early as 1989, the Mental Health Act 
Commission (MHAC, whose responsibilities have now passed to the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC)) drew attention to the practice in its Third Biennial Report 
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1987–1989 (see also grounds, 1990). Some years hence, the interrelational and 
therapeutic impact of doing so was outlined (MHAC, 2008, para 7.19):
At Broadmoor hospital in June 2007, we noted a number of [late transfer] patients 
who were refusing to engage in therapy and otherwise proving to be a severe 
management problem due to their resentment at such late transfers. One patient 
told us that he had been assessed several times in prison and told that he did not 
have a mental disorder, before his sudden transfer towards the end of his sentence.
While the impact of late transfers will not always be therapeutically disastrous, 
the desire among medical practitioners to cultivate an environment conducive 
to therapeutic gain is always jeopardised when it occurs. In an effort to minimise 
disruption, the responsible clinician, in conjunction with her treatment team, 
is at liberty to consider releasing offenders who have reached his or her ‘prison’ 
release date. With EDS-offenders, however, the availability of licence periods 
for those released may delimit medical discretion. Morris, gibbon, and Duggan 
(2007) provide an example of this phenomenon in the case of a late transfer to 
a medium secure unit of a determinate sentence prisoner during the IPP-era:
Although [Mr A] appeared to be reassured by [our plans to discharge him with 
a care plan in the event of disengagement], it had the opposite effect on those 
who wished him to be detained. Consequently, a condition was written into his 
probation license so that if he was discharged as a result of his disengagement, 
this would be interpreted as a breach of his license so that he would immediately 
be returned to prison. He was on license for a further six months.
In this situation, the only option left for the offender is to test the legality of 
his continued detention by applying to a first-tier tribunal (Mental Health). An 
up-to-date medical report favouring discharge, presumably with a suitable after-
care package (as in the case of Mr A, above), will increase his chances of release. 
In other situations, the responsible clinician, while presumably concerned about 
the offender’s placement on the ward, may not support discharge out of fear of 
being held accountable if things go wrong in the community. While, by com-
parison, the fact-finding process undertaken by the tribunal ensures limited 
therapeutic jurisprudence, it has been argued that a humane response by the tri-
bunal to the deprivation of liberty is ‘for a clear determination to be made upon 
[what] formed the view that emergency intervention was necessary' (freckelton, 
2003, p.52). This could include making informal pronouncements about the 
unfavourable circumstances of the offender’s admission to the hospital ward. 
Empirical research already reveals concern among tribunal members about late 
transfers upon which pronouncements could be based:
What’s uncomfortable about the present system is that [the Secretary of State] 
can shift [the offender] into [this] system, which is effectively a life sentence … the 
Court has already sentenced [offender] properly for the offence so [the Secretary of 
State is] is re-sentencing [him] effectively. And I can’t see that that’s right. (MHRT12, 
Medical member) (Trebilcock & Weaver, 2009, pp. 74, 75).
This manoeuvre is particularly important given that late transfers appear unim-
peachable. In the case of R (on the application of SP) v Secretary of State for Justice 
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[2010] EWCA Civ 1590, the Court of Appeal considered whether medical reports, 
which had not considered the issue of whether treatment would have any ben-
efit, were suitable for the purposes of authorising a late transfer. Lady Justice 
Arden replied that the Secretary of State is only concerned to see whether ‘the 
medical practitioners have given some reasons which they consider adequate’ 
(para 23) to support admission. This is unfortunate insofar as Lord Justice Waller 
in the earlier case of R v Secretary of State for Justice, ex parte TF [2008] EWCA Civ 
1457 stated that late transfers should occur only in ‘very exceptional circum-
stances’ (para 31), and that there might be human rights arguments raised if 
transfers were effected simply because ‘a convicted person will be a danger to 
the public if released (as understandable as that concern must be)’ (para 18). 
However, this judgment was limited in scope by the removal of the MHA ‘treat-
ability test’ in October 2008. Since then, ‘appropriate treatment’ (section 3(2) of 
the MHA) is that which has the ‘purpose’ of addressing the respective mental 
disorder or its symptoms (section 145(4)).
Nevertheless, more recently the Department of Health (DH) (2011) issued 
guidance that the Secretary of State for Justice will not consider transferring 
the prisoner unless:
•  Admission to hospital is an urgent necessity;
•  It is necessary for the prisoner’s own health and/or safety and
•  The urgency of need is such that it is not safe to wait until the release date 
for admission to hospital (para 3.13).
However, there is an uncomfortable tautology to these ‘requirements’: the 
‘urgent necessity’ to transfer, which cannot wait until the offender is released 
(and admission effected under civil section), is being defined by the offender’s 
criminal past, while that past implies fulfilment of the transfer conditions. The 
requirements also imply that late transfers take effect because medical practi-
tioners are directing them. While admissions must be recommended by medical 
practitioners under section 12(2) of the MHA, the Ministry of Justice guidance is 
clear that the conditions that must be fulfilled are essentially those of the MHA:
•  The prisoner is suffering from mental disorder;
•  The mental disorder is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for 
the prisoner to be detained in hospital for medical treatment;
•  Appropriate medical treatment is available; and,
•  There is an urgent need for treatment for unsentenced prisoners.
Again, urgency of admission will be easily implied by the offender’s crim-
inogenic character, which is adequately denoted by the nexus of diagnosis and 
public protection concerns. This indicates that the practice of late transfers will 
continue to be the prerogative of the Secretary of State, whatever the guidance 
issued by the Ministry of Justice suggests. Indeed, Bartlett and Sandland (2014) 
recently confirmed that late transfers continue to occur.
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A potential rejoinder to this analysis is the claim that there are insufficient 
beds to cater for an increase in transfers to the secure estate (see e.g. Lord 
Bradley, 2009). Consider, in 2015, the CQC reported that the number of NHS beds 
decreased by 8% between 2010–2011 and 2014–2015. However, this shortfall 
probably results from contractual pressures to maintain occupancy at 90% or 
above (Centre for Mental Health [CMH] 2011). Even so, it has been reported that 
empty beds on wards remain possible in specialised personality disorder units:
The interesting thing is how few referrals we get, not how many … Most of the 
time, we haven’t got enough people to fill 12 beds in a population of 5 million or 
so. (Psychiatrist) (McRae, 2015, p. 332)
Even in areas, such as London, which experiences dynamic populations in spe-
cialist tertiary services, fluctuating occupancy is reported (HM Chief Inspector 
of Prisons for England & Wales, 2013). In such circumstances, SPD-offenders 
perceived by the Secretary of State to be risky will find little competition for 
beds from offenders (perhaps with other forms of mental disorder) still serving 
a custodial sentence. The result is that the interrelational and therapeutic con-
cerns expressed in this paper would remain acute. While we await with interest 
preliminary reflections on the success of the OPDPP, the introduction of the 
LASPO 2012 suggests that it may become an impoverished successor to the 
problematic DSPD pilot.
Conclusion
The introduction of the LASPO 2012 stands to challenge the belief that offenders 
with SPD can be inspired to engage in treatment to mitigate their risk, absent 
legal coercion. Empirical research clearly reveals a link between coercive sen-
tencing and offenders’ willingness to engage in treatment. In the past, the coer-
cive element was provided by the IPP; in future, the EDS is set to disincentivise 
the very group perceived by the government to the most needed treatment. 
The problem has been a lack of engagement with the available empirical data. 
When the Labour government was implementing the DSPD pilot, their Planning 
and Delivery guide (Ministry of Justice, 2005) had a separate section on ‘Legal 
Context’ – which stated (p. 2):
Pilot DSPD services are operating within the ambit of current mental health and 
criminal justice legislation. It is however an evolving picture. The Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 introduced new indeterminate sentences for dangerous offenders whose 
eligibility for release will be dependent on the level of risk they pose in terms of 
sexual and/or violent re-offending … We will keep under review how the treat-
ment and management of dangerous offenders can be helped by changes in 
the law.
In part, the coalition government were hostage to the sudden death knell of 
the IPP: the OPDPP was released (DH and MJ, 2011) only months prior to the 
introduction of the EDS. However, the problems with the IPP had been patently 
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clear for some years; reform had been imminent for some time. The absence 
of serious discussion of the implications of its replacement, when significant 
money was being reinvested to buttress existing high-secure prison services, 
may prove to be a missed opportunity to set the foundations for treatment 
engagement among SPD-offenders.
Might part of the problem be generally unwillingness among the govern-
ment, and the dedicated medical practitioners advising them, to problematise 
the proposed investment in treatment by predicating its potential success on 
external factors? This seems to me to be an unfortunate cost of cloaking the 
dangerous SPD-offender in manifest immorality that we refuse to relate to. few 
among the law abiding have the introspective skills to admit that the quality of 
life of others could be improved by submitting to treatment aimed at effecting 
a new self-understanding; yet, most, if not all, of us would seriously consider 
such treatment if coerced. As one psychologist sensibly put it: ‘you don’t need 
[to have SPD] to have [that] different motivation. you could understand it’. Thus, 
coercive law is both a sword and shield.
In this paper, it has been argued that the upshot of the lack of coercion 
provided by the EDS is that public protection will be effected by extending 
the detention of SPD offender in hospital, by warrant of the Secretary of State 
for Justice under section 47 of the MHA. for medical practitioners, the result 
of working with offenders experiencing late transfers has often been chronic 
stress (MJ, 2011b). This is a further way in which the government suffers from a 
lack of joined up thinking on the issues in policy it (re-) produces.
More widely, the Kuf appears to have achieved encouraging results in increas-
ing knowledge of personality disorder, and building efficacy, compassion and 
capability among workforces (Davies, Sampson, Beesley, Smith, & Baldwin, 2014). 
However, it is hard to imagine those same workforces gaining job satisfaction 
when all they have in common with their patients is a desire to leave hospital.
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